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This paper attempts to provide a clearer picture of individual’s donation motivations, 
particularly the roles of private incentives such as warm-glow and prestige. Based on 
the theoretical work of Harbaugh (1998a), we adopt an extended Stone-Geary utility 
function to simulate donor’s utility, prestige, and optimal donations given different 
reporting plans. A series of laboratory experiments are designed to test the model and 
its predictions on different reporting plans. The experiments are conducted at Fudan 
University, China. Data from 141 participants show that the reporting plans have 
insignificant effects on the amount of donations, but category reporting changes 
people’s donation behavior. Different donation distributions under the category 




In latest news released by Reuters, US charitable donations are reported over $300 
billion in the year of 2007, 76.3% of which was given by individuals1. In 2006, 
individual giving accounts for 83% of $295 billion total charitable donations in US. 
This total amount is estimated to be a threefold increase in inflation-adjusted terms 
since 1964 by the Giving USA Foundation. Generosity has been a long-standing 
American tradition, and one that continues to grow. In an international context, 
despite the varying levels and distribution of wealth, tax and welfare schemes across 
countries, we also see a continuous donation momentum for both domestic and 
international causes across countries, especially in wealthy countries (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2006). 
 
The question that the economists always ask themselves is why do people donate? If 
people are self interested, why would they give away a considerable fraction of their 
income to others, sometimes just for the benefit of strangers? What are the 
motivations behind? Explanations start from pure altruism (Hochman and Roger 1969, 
Kolm 1969), a preference for the well being of others. The motivation of pure 
altruism is challenged by an incomplete crowding out effect by reality and laboratory 
evidence (Konow 2006). The crowding out effect refers to the reduction in private 
donations due to public spending. Economists then realize that individuals may derive 
                                                        
1 The news is released by REUTERS on 23 Jun, 2008, 0500 hrs IST, titled “US charitable donations 
top $300 bn in 2007”. 
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some private benefits from the act of donating other than just caring about others or 
the public goods that are purchased by the donations. Private benefits of donation 
could be more intricate since they involve the psychological side of individuals. 
Explanations include warm glow (Andreoni 1989), the satisfaction from giving; 
prestige (Harbaugh 1998a ), the preference of having one’s donations known to the 
others; and wealth status signal (Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad 1996), etc. 
 
In the market for charitable giving, the donors are on the supply side of donations and 
the charitable organizations are on the demand side. Early studies on charitable giving 
mostly focused on donors. The role of fund-raisers on the demand side was left 
unexplored until very recently. It is agreed now that the charities can be an active 
agent in this market and there are many strategies they can adopt in fund raising to 
increase donations. One of the strategies that the charities are frequently using is 
category reporting. 
 
With category reporting, charities announce individual donations in categories. Those 
who donate less than the minimum category amount will not be announced, and those 
who donate equal to or more than the minimum category amount will be announced 
as what the category refers to. An example is that: for an orchestra society2, donors 
will be reported as “Contributor” if they donate $25-$49, as “Sponsor” if they donate 
$50-$99, as “Patron” if they donate $100-$249, as “Guarantor” if they donate 
                                                        
2 The Illinois Valley Symphony Orchestra. Visit the website: http://www.ivso.org/ 
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$250-$499, as “Sustainer” if they donate no less than $500. This practice is popular 
among charities and institutions of different kinds. A theoretical model (Harbaugh 
1998a) incorporating warm glow and prestige justifies the practice the category 
reporting. It implies that if people do care about prestige, charities can take advantage 
of the taste and increase donations by using category reporting. An empirical study 
(Harbaugh 1998b) shows that category reporting is capable of increasing total 
donations. If category reporting is that effective as the model predicts, it is possible 
that this practice caters for some special tastes of donors such as prestige that can help 
to increase the donations. We believe a research on the category reporting practice 
could further reveal the donation motivations. 
 
This paper is another effort on a clearer picture of individual’s donation motivations, 
particularly the roles of private incentives such as warm-glow and prestige. Based on 
the theoretical work of Harbaugh (1998a), we adopt an extended Stone-Geary utility 
function to simulate donor’s utility, prestige, and optimal donations given different 
reporting plans. Furthermore, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments to test the 
model and its predictions on different reporting plans. The experiments are conducted 
at Fudan University, China. Data from 141 participants show that the reporting plans 
have insignificant effects on the amount of donations, but category reporting changes 
people’s donation behavior. Different donation distributions under the category 
reporting plan and the category no reporting plan provide evidence of the prestige 
effects. 
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 The following parts of the thesis are organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
previous theoretical, empirical and experimental studies on charitable giving and the 
prestige effects. In Section 3, we provide the modified model and its predictions. 
Section 4 shows a data simulation of critical values under different reporting plans 
based on the model. Section 5 describes the experimental design. Section 6 presents 
the data analysis and the results. Section 7 contains conclusion and discussions. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
 
Economists have been dedicated to answer the puzzling question that how the 
unselfish behavior such as donating can be explained on a self-interest basis. 
 
The first motivation suggested by economists is pure altruism. They believe that 
charitable giving creates a public good, and it is the amount or quality of the public 
good that increases utility for the donors. Hochman and Rogers (1969) and Kolm 
(1969) are the first to recognize the public good properties of donations. Based on 
their model, Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) theoretically show the crowding out 
effect of government grants on the private donations. Bergstorm, Blume, and Varian 
(1986) further develop the model and predict that if everyone gives to a public good, 
income redistribution would have no effect due to the crowding out effect. Andreoni 
(1988) challenge this model by pushing it to a limit and predicts that only a few rich 
people will give to public good in a large economy and this prediction is contradicted 
with the reality. 
 
An alternative explanation is to incorporate the properties of private good into 
individual donations. Becker (1974) first develops the model where it is the amount 
that the donor gives directly enters his utility function. Andreoni (1989) makes the 
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model more realistic and more predictive by incorporating a component of “warm 
glow of giving” to donor’s utility function. It states that people obtain satisfaction by 
doing the right things, and they prefer their own contributions to the public good to 
others’ contribution. The model explains the incomplete crowding out effect on 
private donations. 
 
In the model developed by Romano and Yildirim (2001), announcement on 
individual’s donation is viewed as a means of introducing a sequential game among 
donors, which would yield more provision of public goods than the simultaneous 
games when warm glow enters the utility function of donors. The model verifies the 
warm glow effect and the organizational role of charitable organizations. 
 
Besides, Hollander (1990) argues that people donate for the “valued social approval”, 
which depends on the difference between their own donations and the social average. 
Glazer and Konrad (1990) present a signaling model where donors make donations in 
order to signal their income status to others. 
 
Harbaugh (1998a) develops a model where motivation for giving is separated into 
“warm-glow” and “prestige”. The former term refers to an internal satisfaction 
coming from the act of giving and the latter term refers to utility coming from having 
one’s own donation known to the others. The model implies that charities can increase 
donation by using category reporting if people do have a taste for prestige. 
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 2.2 Testing the Theories 
 
Studies have been conducted to test the theories of donation motivations. In this part, 
we review the empirical works, laboratory experiments and field experiments 
focusing on the effect of prestige. 
 
Harbaugh (1998b) uses data of donations to a law school from its alumni to estimate 
the utility function of the donors under a category reporting scheme and measures the 
effect of the prestige motive on donations. However, as an empirical study, this 
estimation suffers from a problem of data accuracy: there is no precise measure of 
income or utility level of the donors. Some other variables that can neither be 
controlled in such an empirical work. 
 
A lab experiment of Rege and Telle (2004) investigates how two treatment effects – 
social approval (by revealing people’s identity and contributions) and framing (by 
verbally suggesting contributing) affect cooperation among strangers in a public good 
game. They find that the revelation of people’s identity and their contributions 
increases voluntary contributions significantly. This study provides the evidence of 
the prestige effect in the donation behavior. 
 
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) remove the confidentiality in a lab experiment of a 
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repeated public good game. In the experiment, identification of the participants is 
revealed via digital public photographs and an announcement of their contribution, in 
exact amount or in category. The result shows that identification has significant 
effects and categories have potential influence on the contributions; to be more 
specific, though categories do not increase average contributions, they significantly 
shift the distribution of contributions. It suggests that people do have a taste for 
prestige and prefer their contributions to be known by the others. It also implies that 
category can be a powerful mechanism to affect individual’s contribution decisions.  
 
Another experimental study by Andreoni and Petrie (2000) is to test the existence of 
prestige and social comparison provided by the charitable organizations. One of the 
six treatments in their experiment is category reporting and it is shown to have an 
impact on donors’ behavior. However, this treatment shed little lights on the nature of 
category reporting practice in charitable giving, because the treatment is not aimed at 
investigating an optimal category but at separating leaders, laggards, and followers 
among participants. The category is not carefully designed and there is no variation of 
it. 
 
Soetevent (2005) conducted a field experiment in 30 Dutch churches for a period of 
29 weeks, he finds that non-anonymous collecting method increase the total 
contribution for charitable causes but have no effects for public goods causes3, and 
                                                        
3 Contribution for charitable causes refers to the offerings that are earmarked to contributors’ own parish, whereas 
contribution for public goods causes refers to the offerings that serve causes outside the contributors’ own parish. 
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the positive effect of identification fades out as time goes by. Field experiments are an 
ideal way to investigate the donation behavior for it not only can control variables by 
specific settings, but also can induce individual in a most natural way. 
 
Shang and Croson (2006) conducted a field experiment on an on-air fundraising 
campaign for a public radio station to examine the effect of social information on 
individual contributions. Social information here refers to the donations collected 
from similar previous campaigns. Results suggest that social information increases 
individual contributions and the contributions do not crowd out future contribution. 
The boundary conditions of the social information effect are also identified, which is a 
support for the conformity explanation (Bernheim 1994). 
 
The above theoretical, empirical and experimental studies suggest a taste of prestige 
and would help to justify the practice of category reporting practice by charities. 
However, there is no in-depth investigation into this practice except Harbaugh’s 
(1998b) empirical test, especially a look into the comparison between different 
reporting plans and effects of various categories. In this paper, we provide an 
experimental analysis of category reporting in charitable giving based on Harbaugh’s 
(1998a) theoretical model. We conduct the experiment in a controlled donation 
environment to induce different donating behaviors under different reporting plans 
and category settings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental 
study specified in the arising practice of category reporting. 
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3. Model and Its Predictions 
 
The study is based on Harbaugh’s work (Harbaugh 1998a), which explicitly separates 
the motivation of donation into warm glow and prestige. The separation is important. 
Since warm glow is the utility coming from the act of giving itself, it is out of the 
control of the charity. Prestige, on the other hand, is the utility coming from having 
the amount of a donation known to the others and is obtained only when the charity 
makes the report. If people do have a taste of prestige, the charity would be able to 
exploit its effect and increase the total amount of donation. 
 
We extend the model by introducing a coefficient of α, the sensitivity of prestige to 
reporting, for realistic implication and generalization. However, the introduction of 





There are some important assumptions regarding the market for charitable giving of 
this model.  
 
First, donors care only about private benefits of giving, which could be prestige or 
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warm glow or both4. This is possible for first, even for a small population, the effect 
of individual’s donation on the public good could be diluted to a neglectable level; 
and second, many public goods purchased by the donations are not for the donors’ 
benefits. Examples are that people would donate for those suffering from some natural 
disaster far away from their own country and a deaf business man would donate for an 
orchestra society.  
 
The second assumption is that warm glow and prestige are independent of social 
interactions. It is true that donors care about his social status and could be influenced 
by others donations, but they do not know others’ donations when they are making 
their own decisions in this model. In another word, it is a one-shot simultaneous move 
game. This assumption is an implication of the first assumption. 
 
The third assumption is that prestige is only based on the charity reporting and there 
are no other signals that people can derive prestige from, such as income level.  
 
 
3.2 The Donor’s Problem 
 
The donors have a utility function of U = U (x, p, d)5, where x is private good, p is 
prestige, and d is warm glow which is equal to the donation. They also face a budget 
                                                        
4 Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) statistically reject the existence of altruism effect – the public good 
benefits of giving from their specific public good experiments. 
5 Ux > 0, Up > 0, Ud > 0; Uxx < 0, Upp < 0, Udd < 0. 
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constraint: m = x + d, in which m is the income. Assuming there is no income tax and 
donation is not tax deductible, we set both prices of the private good and the donation 
to 1. We can rewrite the utility function as U = U (m-d, p, d) = V (p, d; m). For a given 




Figure 3.1. The Level Curve in the (p,d) Space  
 
Slope of the level curve is (Ux – Ud)/ Up. It is the marginal rate of substitution 
between d and p. When donation is at low level, before the inflection point, d < x, Ud 
> Ux, an increase in d and a decrease in x will increase the total utility. To maintain a 
given utility level, p must decrease. As donation increases beyond the inflection point, 
Ud < Ux, an increase in d and a same decrease in x will decrease the total utility, 
requiring an increase in p.  Therefore the level curve is in a U shape. An increase in 




 3.3 The Charity’s Problem 
 
The charity offers prestige to a donor by making a report r on the donation he or she 
made. For the donor, the level of prestige he or she gains is only dependent on the 
report made by the charity. p = p (r) = p (r (d)) = f (d). p is a function of r, which is a 
function of d; so p is a function of d. The relationship of p and d can also be shown in 
a (p, d) space.  
 
Under different reporting plans, the charity reports individual donations in different 
ways, affecting the prestige that each donor may get. But warm glow is the same 
across plans, since they are equal to the exact amount of the donation. As a utility 
maximizing individual, the donor responds differently to different reporting plans. In 
another word, he or she will adjust the optimal donation amount according to the plan. 
 
 
3.4 Different Reporting Plans 
 
The reporting plans that the charity can make use of include the no reporting plan, the 
exact reporting plan and the category reporting plan. 
 
1. No Reporting 
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Under the no reporting plan, the charity does not report individual’s donation. p = 0. 
The prestige line overlaps the horizontal axis. Individuals donate as it is an 
anonymous donating campaign and get zero prestige in return. They will maximize 









Figure 3.2 The Optimal Donation under No Reporting  
 
 
2. Exact Reporting 
Under the exact reporting plan, the charity reports the exact amount that each 
individual donates, r = d. The donors translate the reporting into a feeling of prestige 
by a fraction of α. p = αd. α is the sensitivity of prestige to reporting, and it measures 
how much the donors care about the report made by the charity. 0 ≤α ≤ 1. α 
increases with the factors that could add value to the report made by the charity such 
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as the good fame, credibility, large scale and substantial influence of the charitable 
organization. The donors maximize their utility where Ux = Ud + Up at de, and de > d0. 
That means the exact reporting plan will yield more donations than the no reporting 






p = 0 
d0 de dm dm’ 
exact reporting 





Figure 3.3 The Optimal Donation under Exact Reporting 
The prestige line under the exact reporting plan and the level curve under the no 
reporting plan intersect at dm’ and dm. The lower dm’ is less than d0 and will be ignored 
by the donors since the donors can achieve a higher level utility if they donate d0. The 
higher dm is the maximum incentive compatible donation, where all rents from 
prestige gained form reporting are extracted from the donor and he is left with only 
the amount of utility as he could have under the no reporting plan. dm is a critical 
value under the category reporting plan. The level of dm is determined by the utility 
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level under the no reporting plan and α. Given a utility level, the larger the α, the 
higher the dm, and dm is the highest when α = 1. 
 
3. Category Reporting 
Under the category reporting plan, the charity sets the minimum amount for a category. 
Let the minimum bracket amount be db. Those who donate less than the bracket 
amount get zero prestige and those who donate the bracket amount or more get credit 
for the amount of the category. The prestige line is a line that steps up at the category 
amount. Donors maximize their utility where Ux = Ud + Up. 
 
1) If db < d0, donors can reach a higher level of utility if they donate d0 due to the 
warm glow effect, and the charity receives the same donation as it would under the no 
reporting plan. 
 
2) If d0 ≤ db < de, donors can maximize their utility by giving the bracket amount 
and thus receiving credit from it. The charity will receive more than they would under 
the no reporting plan, but less than that under the exact reporting plan. 
 
3) If de ≤ db < dm, donors can maximize their utility by giving the bracket amount 
and the charity receives more than under the exact reporting plan. 
 
4) If db ≥ dm, donors will only give d0 as they were under the no reporting plan. If 
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they donate dm or more, donors would be left with a lower utility level than he could 
have got under the no reporting plan. The utility level under the no reporting plan 
would be the highest utility level they can achieve under this circumstance. So the 














Based on the model, we have the following predictions to test: 
1. The exact reporting plan will yield more donations than the no reporting plan.  
(d0 < de).  
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 2. The category reporting plan will yield no fewer donations than the no reporting 
plan. If the category (db) is set below the optimal donation under no reporting plan 
(d0), donors can increase their utility by donating d0. If the category is set above 
the optimal donation under the no reporting plan, donors will just donate the 
category amount because of the additional prestige utility. If the category is set too 
high and exceeds the maximum incentive compatible donation dm, donors will just 
ignore the category and donate the optimal donation under the no reporting plan 
(d0). For a proper category, the category reporting plan will result in more 
donations compared to the no reporting plan.  
 
3. Whether the category reporting plan will yield more donations than the exact 
reporting plan depends on the relationship between the category (db) and the 
optimal donation under the exact reporting plan (de). If db < de, the exact reporting 
plan is superior. If de < db< dm, the category reporting plan is superior. As the 
category increases and donating at the category level, donors increase their 
prestige and warm glow at the cost of private goods, and they will stop taking 
advantage of the increasing prestige component of utility at a certain point once 
their utility has decreased to the level that they can achieve without any reporting. 
Thus, if db > dm, people will just ignore the category and donate d0 as if they were 
under the no reporting plan. 
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4. Under the category reporting plan, people tend to donate the threshold amount of 
the category (db).  
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4. Data Simulation 
 
We adopt an extended Stone-Geary utility function to simulate the donor’s utility, 
optimal donations and prestige given the maximum level of utility under different 
reporting plans based on the model. 
 
The utility function takes the form of  
a ln (m-d) + b ln (p) + c ln (d), when there is some reporting { U = a ln (m-d) + c ln (d),  when there is no reporting 
 
where, m is income, d is donation, ln (m-d) is the private good component of the 
utility, ln(p) is the prestige component of the utility and p = αd. ln(d) is the warm 
component of the utility. a,b,c are coefficients. In the simulation, we set the 
parameters as follows: m=100, and a=20, b=3, c=1. It is assumed that the endowment 
for private good consumptions and donation is 100 units, and the donor values private 
goods more than prestige and warm, and values prestige more than warm glow. α = 
0.5. We can change the value of the parameters as the assumptions vary. 
 
4.1 No Reporting 
 
When there is no reporting, the donors’ utility function is U = 20 ln (100-d) + ln (d), 
and its maximum level is Umax = 92.69, when d = d0 = 5. d0 is the optimal donation 
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under the no reporting plan. 
 
When Umax = 92.69 under no reporting, the relationship between p and d is:  
ln (p) = (1/3) * [92.69 – 20 ln (100-d) – ln (d)] 
 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
d
p
prestige enjoyed by the donor = ln (p)
prestige offered by the charity = ln (p)
 
 
Figure 4.1 Simulation of No Reporting 
 
 
4.2 Exact Reporting 
 
On the donor’s side, the utility function is U = 20 ln (100-d) + 3 ln (p) + ln (d). Since 
p = αd and α = 0.5, ln (p) = ln (αd) = ln (0.5d), U = 20 ln (100-d) + 4 lnd + 3 ln0.5. 
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Umax = 97.63, when d = de = 17. de is the optimal donation under the exact reporting 
plan. 
 
When Umax = 97.63 under the exact reporting plan, the relationship between p and d is 
ln (p) = (1/3) * [97.69 – 20 ln (100-d) – ln (d)] 
 
On the charity’s side, ln (p) = ln (0.5 d). The prestige line and the level curve in a (p,d) 








1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
d
p
prestige enjoyed by the donor = ln (p)
prestige offered by the charity = ln (p)
 
Figure 4.2 Simulation of Exact Reporting  
 
 
4.3 Category Reporting 
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Since de = 17, we set two categories: db1 = 30, db2 = 50. 
1) When db1 = 30 
On the donor’s side, U = 20 ln (100-d) + ln (d) if d < 30, and U = 20 ln(100-d) + 3 
ln(15) + lnd if d ≥ 30. Umax = 96.50, when d = 30. Thus, donors will donate the 
minimum amount of the category. Their prestige level curve is:  
ln (p) = (1/3) * [ 96.50 – 20 ln (100-d) – ln (d)] 
 










1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53
d
p
prestige enjoyed by the donor = ln (p)
prestige offered by the charity = ln (p)
 
Figure 4.3 Simulation of Category Reporting  
 
2) When db2 = 50 
On the donor’s side, U = 20 ln (100-d) + ln (d) if d < 50 and U = 20 ln (100-d) + 3 ln 
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(25) + ln (d) if d ≥ 50. Umax = 92.69 when d=d0=5 under this plan. Donors will just 
ignore the category and donate the no reporting-optimal amount as the model predicts. 
 
A lower utility level than that could be achieved under the no reporting plan by 
donating the category amount under this category reporting plan suggests db2 = 50 is 
not an appropriate category. It might exceed the dm, the maximum incentive 
compatible donation for the donor. 
 
 
4.4 Evaluating dm 
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Figure 4.4 Simulation of Evaluating dm 
 
 
The lower level of dm is dm1 = 3 and it is less than d0 = 5. It will not be a category for 
the charity because it will be ignored by the donors. 
 
The higher level of dm is dm2 = 46. Donating a category amount as dm2, donors are 
indifferent between no reporting and category reporting. When the category exceeds 
dm2, donors will have a lower utility level by donating the category amount and they 
will donate as if they were under the no reporting plan. This explains why people turn 
back to d0 =5 when the category is set as 50. The category amount of 50 exceeds the 
maximum incentive compatible donation of 46 in this case. 
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To summarize, under the no reporting plan, a donor will donate 5 out of 100 and enjoy 
a utility level of 92.69 without any prestige gained. Under the exact reporting plan, the 
prestige he could enjoy is a linear function of his donation and he will be able to 
achieve a highest utility level of 97.63 if he donates 17. Under the category reporting 
plan, when the category is set at 30, which is lower than the maximum incentive 
compatible donation of 46, the donor will tend to donate the category amount and 
achieve a highest utility level of 96.50 under this category reporting plan. The charity 
receives more donation than it would under the no reporting plan and the exact 
reporting plan. When the category is set at 50, the best strategy for the donor is to 
donate the optimal amount under the no reporting plan of 5 and enjoys a higher utility 
of 92.69 with no prestige. If he donates 50 or more, though he would enjoy a high 
prestige, the trade off is a decrease in his private good. Since he is assumed to value 
private good much more than prestige, the total utility level will decrease to below the 
maximum utility level under the no reporting plan. 
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5. Experimental Design 
 
To test the model and its predictions, we conduct a series of lab experiments in a 




A pilot experiment is run in Singapore with 23 participants, all of whom are 
undergraduate students from National University of Singapore. 4 within-subjects 
treatments of No Reporting, Exact Reporting, Category Reporting, and Category No 





The main experiments are conducted at Fudan University, China. There are 6 sessions 
and 25 participants for each. All participants are students of Fudan University and 
recruited through a campus BBS system.  
 
Altogether, we have 141 effective participants. 9 students registered for the 
experiments but did not come. In the 141 effective participants, 51 are male and 90 
are female. In terms of faculty backgrounds, 76 are from arts, 35 are from science and 
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engineering, and the rest 28 are coming from business, law, computer, and the others. 
98 of the participants are undergraduate students and 43 of them are of higher degrees. 
 
 
5.3 Endowments and Treatments 
 
Each participant is given 2 endowments: ￥20 and ￥50. They are to make a series 
of allocation decisions under different treatments and endowments. Given each 
endowment, they will have to decide how much of it will be allocated as donations 
and how much of it to keep for their own use.  
 
10 treatments are systematically distributed across sessions to generate 
between-subject and within-subject data. The 10 treatments are shown in Table 5.1. 
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① No Reporting (NR) -- -- 
② Exact Reporting (ER) -- -- 
③ Category Reporting 1 (CR1) (5-20) (15-50) 
④ Category Reporting 2 (CR2) (8-20) (20-50) 
⑤ Category Reporting 3 (CR3) (12-20) (30-50) 
⑥ Category Reporting 4 (CR4)  (16-20) (40-50) 
⑦ Category No Reporting 1 (CNR1) (5-20) (15-50) 
⑧ Category No Reporting 2 (CNR2) (8-20) (20-50) 
⑨ Category No Reporting 3 (CNR3) (12-20) (30-50) 
⑩ Category No Reporting 4 (CNR4) (16-20) (40-50) 
 
For the Category Reporting treatments, the participants are instructed that if they 
donate no less than the category amount, they will be reported as a “Star Donor” in 
the donor list and we will announce the “Star Donor” list at the end the session. For 
the Category No Reporting treatments, the participants are instructed that if they 
donate no less that the category amount, they will be regarded as a “Star Donor”, but 




The 10 treatments fall into 4 groups: No Reporting (NR), Exact Reporting (ER), 
Category Reporting (CR), and Category No Reporting (CNR). NR is the baseline 
treatment. The difference between ER and NR is the announcement of the exact 
donation amount, and the effect of the announcement could be considered as prestige. 
The difference with NR and CNR is the category, and we can examine the effect of 
category by comparing these two treatments. The difference between NR and CR is a 
combination of category and announcement in category. Although donations are 
announced both under ER and CR, they are done in different ways: one with the exact 
amount and one in category and there is an additional effect of category for CR. The 
difference between CNR and CR is expected the same as that between NR and ER, 
the announcement or the prestige effect. 
 
For such complicated treatments, the ideal way is to allow only one treatment for each 
participant and run many more sessions to avoid any carry-on effects. Due to the time 
and budget constraints, we have the following treatment structure (Table 5.2).  
 
For data analysis, we basically use the data of NR from group 1, ER from group 2, CR 
from group3 and group 4, and CNR from group 5 and group 6 for between-subjects 
comparison. These data are free from the carry-on effects of different plans, but they 
might be subject to carry-on effects of endowments and category settings.  
 
We can also use the data generated from the same group to do within-subjects analysis 
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and compare the results with those from the between-subjects analysis. For example, 
we can compare NR and CR2 by using the data of 1_NR20 and 3_CR20_2 for 
between-subject analysis, and we can also use the data of 1_NR20 and 1_CR20_2 for 
within-subject analysis. If the comparisons give the same results, we can say the 
results are robust. 
 
Treatments in one group are done in pairs and in a random sequence. The participants 
have no idea of the next decisions they have to make when they are doing the current 
ones. 
 


















































                                                        
6 To read the treatments, “1_” refers to group1 and so on. “NR”, “ER”, “CR”, and “CNR” refer to 
different reporting plans. Endowments of ￥20，￥50 follow the reporting plans. There are four 
category settings for CR and CNR, as signaled. Detailed category settings are shown in the parenthesis. 
 
7 Bolded treatments are those used in data analysis. 
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 5.4 Laboratory Settings 
 
In the laboratory, every participant randomly picks a seat number as their 
identification (ID). A seat table is drawn on the blackboard in front of the laboratory, 
and all the participants can see each other and their ID. The ID would be used to make 
a report, if necessary. An instruction sheet, a series of allocation decision sheets, a 
survey form and an endorsement letter from the beneficiary are placed in an envelope 
on the seat. The experimenter reads the instruction sheet aloud and all the participants 
follow the instructions and make independent allocation decisions. They are not 
allowed to communicate with other participants except the lab assistants. All the 






The beneficiary of this donation experiment is Fudan Students Home, a campus 
charitable organization for the benefits of the less privileged students in the university. 
All the donations collected from the experiment will be sent to the organization and 
the organization promises to use the sum of money for its operation expenditure and 
organizing activities such as outing and visiting for its member students. This kind of 
usage of the donations eliminates the public goods properties of it to a great extent 
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since the public goods it purchases are not directly enjoyed by the donors. Even if 
there are participants who happens to be members of the charitable organization and 
will benefit from the donations later on, the benefits would be the same across all 
treatments and would not influence the effects of private benefits when we vary the 
plans or categories. Furthermore, the corporation with this organization creates a real 
donating environment for the participants and helps to induce the real incentive of the 
donating behavior.  
 
 
5.6 Reporting Method 
 
For those sessions with reporting treatment (ER, CR), we make the report on the ID 
after all the allocation decisions have been made. Since there is more than one 
treatment to report, we invite one of the participants to pick a card to find the 
reporting-binding treatment. The ex-post report is to control the social interaction 





The participants are compensated privately at the end of experiment. Each of them 
picks a card to find their compensation-binding treatment. The difference between the 
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endowment and the amount they decide to donate of the binding treatment would be 
given to them in cash as the compensation for participating the experiment. This 
compensation is regarded as the private good part in the utility function. The 




We start the result presentation with the non-parametric analysis on treatments, and 
then look at the effects of income, gender and faculty backgrounds. We also run panel 
data regressions with dummy variables to test the significance of coefficients. 
 
For the non-parametric analysis, we use Mann-Whitney test for between-subject 
comparison and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for within-subject 




6.1 Treatment Effects: Mean Comparison 
 
For the ￥20 endowment, the average donations under different treatments are shown 
in Table 6.1.  
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Table 6.1 Treatment Effects: Mean Statistics (￥20) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
all 20 234 8.066239 5.411886 0 20 
nr20 23 9.173913 5.789113 0 20 
er20 25 8.68 6.24313 0 20 
cr20_1 25 6.6 4.092676 0 18 
cr20_2 25 7.48 4.00125 0 18 
cr20_3 24 8.208333 5.437224 0 15 
cr20_4 24 8.916667 6.768962 0 20 
cnr20_1 22 5.590909 4.615286 0 18 
cnr20_2 22 8.75 3.504249 0 15 
cnr20_3 22 10.54545 4.217055 0 18 
cnr20_4 22 6.772727 7.295999 0 20 
 
1. NR vs. ER 
The observations are from the treatments of (1_NR20) for NR and (2_ER20) for ER. 
 
The average donation of NR is ￥9.17, and this amount is regarded as d0, the optimal 
donation under the no reporting plan. On the other hand, the average donation of ER, 
which is known as de, the optimal donation under the exact reporting plan, is ￥8.68. 
From the mean statistics, de is less than d0, though the difference is not significant 
according to the Mann-Whitney test (p=0.7001). This result contradicts the 
predictions that the exact reporting will yield higher donation than the no reporting 
plan.  
 
2. NR vs. CR 
The observations are from the treatments of (1_NR20) for NR, and (3_CR20_1), 
(3_CR20_2), (4_CR20_3), and (4_CR20_4) for CR. 
 37
 Comparing NR and CR, we are surprised to find that none of the average donations of 
CR (CR1=￥6.6, CR2=￥7.48, CR3=￥8.21, CR4=￥8.92) is more than that of NR 
(￥9.17). Only that of CR1 is significantly less than that of NR. All the other 
comparisons are not significantly different. The p values can be found in Table 6.2. 
This result means CR is not superior to NR at all, and it contradicts the prediction that 
the category reporting plan will yield no fewer donations than the no reporting plan. 
 
3. ER vs. CR 
The observations are from the treatments of (2_ER20) for ER, and (3_CR20_1), 
(3_CR20_2), (4_CR20_3), and (4_CR20_4) for CR. 
 
From the mean statistics, CR is not necessarily superior to ER. The average donation 
of CR1, CR2, and CR3 are less than that of ER, but CR4 is higher. The ambiguous 
relationship between ER and CR is as predicted. But none of the differences is 
significant. The p values can be found in Table 6.2. 
 
4. CR vs. CNR 
The observations are from the treatments of (3_CR20_1), (3_CR20_2), (4_CR20_3), 
(4_CR20_4) for CR, and (6_CNR20_1), (5_CNR20_2), (5_CNR20_3), and 
(6_CNR20_4) for CNR.  
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From the mean statistics, we find that CR1 (￥6.6) > CNR1 (￥5.59), CR2 (￥7.48) < 
CNR2 (￥8.75), CR3 (￥8.21) < CNR3 (￥10.55), and CR4 (￥8.92) > CNR4 
(￥6.77). The Mann-Whitney test shows that only CR2 is significantly less than 
CNR2 and all the other comparisons are not significantly different (Table 6.2). It 
seems neither CR nor CNR is dominant. We have no evidence of the prestige effect 
from a mean comparison between these two reporting plans. 
 
4. Within CR and CNR 
The observations are from the treatments of (3_CR20_1), (3_CR20_2), (4_CR20_3), 
(4_CR20_4) for CR, and (6_CNR20_1), (5_CNR20_2), (5_CNR20_3), and 
(6_CNR20_4) for CNR. 
 
When the category increases, the average donations under CR keep increasing 
accordingly (CR1=￥6.6, CR2=￥7.48, CR3=￥8.21, CR4=￥8.92). The highest 
category of CR4 does not decrease the average donation. The result contradicts the 
prediction that if the category is set too high, the donor would ignore the category and 
donate d0. One possibility is that CR4 is not high enough to exceed dm, but for an 
endowment of ￥20 and from the result of the simulation8, it is much likely that CR4 
of ￥16 is a category high enough to exceed dm. If this is the case, then the prestige 
effect demonstrated here is stronger for a high category than what the model predicts. 
The p values for within CR comparison can be found in Table 6.2. 
                                                        
8 The simulation shows that for an endowment of 100, dm is evaluated to be 46. For CR4, the category 
is 80% of the endowment, much higher than 46% in the simulation. 
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 In comparison, the average donation of CNR increases when the category increases 
from CNR1 to CNR3, but decreases sharply under CNR4 (CNR1=￥5.59, CNR2=
￥8.75, CNR3=￥10.55, CNR4=￥6.77). This might because there is no prestige 
offered by CNR, a higher category become less attractive to the participants. This is 
an evidence of the existence of the prestige effect. The p values for within CNR 
comparison can be found in Table 6.2 
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9 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for between-subject comparison and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for within-subject comparison. 
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 To summarize, the results of the mean comparison for treatments effects is as follows, 
1) No Reporting yields higher donations than Exact Reporting, though the difference 
is not significant. 
2) No Reporting yields higher donations than Category Reporting, though not all the 
differences are significant. 
3) Category Reporting can do better or worse than Exact Reporting, though not 
significantly, depending on how the category is set. 
4) The relationship between Category Reporting and Category No Reporting is 
ambiguous. There is evidence of prestige effect when the category is set high. 
 
 
6.2 Treatment Effects: Frequency Analysis 
 
1. NR vs. ER 
The frequency histograms of NR and ER are shown in Figure 6.1. They are in a 
similar pattern. Donations concentrate on the points of ￥0, ￥5, ￥10, and ￥20 
under NR, and ￥10 is most concentrated amount. Since all of them are multiples of 
5 and they emerge under the baseline treatment, we call them “natural focal points”. 
These natural focal points do not disappear under ER. ￥10 is the most concentrated 
amount under ER as well.  
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The indifference between NR and ER has the following possible explanations. First, 
people do not care about the prestige at all. Second, the Exact Reporting plan does not 
provide enough prestige benefits to the donors. An announcement of the exact 
donation might offer less prestige than an announcement with a title such as “Star 
Donor”. Third, donors may feel uncomfortable with an announcement of exact 
amount and this might discourage donors to donate compared to the no reporting plan. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Donation Distributions under NR and ER (￥20) 
 
 
2. NR vs. CR and Within CR 
The frequency histograms of CR are shown in Figure 6.2. In comparison with NR, 
there is an obvious shift of focal points under CR from the natural ones to the 
category threshold amount. In another word, the category amount of CR eliminates 
the natural focal points of NR.  
 











































amount. Notice that ￥5 one of the natural focal points as well. At the same time, all 
the other natural focal points disappear under CR1.  
 
For CR2 with a category amount of ￥8, most donations focus on the category 
amount as well. In contrast with CR1, concentrations on the natural focal points as￥0, 
￥5, and ￥10 appear again, though a focus on ￥10 shifts to ￥8. It might because 
people tend to donate the natural focal points. When the category amount is not one of 
them, some people will again turn to the natural focal points amount; but many more 
are drawn to the category amount for the additional prestige benefits.  
 
As the category amount increases, participants adjust their behavior accordingly. For 
category 3 with a higher category amount of ￥12, the number of people who tend to 
donate at this amount decreases, but it is still the mode. As we continue to increase the 
category amount to ￥16 under CR4, more people shrink. Compared to category 1, 
less than one-third of the participants are attracted to the high category. The rest are 
evenly distributed across the natural focal points, not the same as under NR where the 
most concentrate at ￥10. The retreat from the high category is possibly because that 
the category of ￥16 does exceed the dm in this case. This effect is not captured by 
the mean comparison. 
 
The above analysis implies that as long as the category is not set too high, people tend 
to donate at the category threshold amount for the prestige benefits when the charity 
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makes the report. But they will have a second thought if the category is too high, since 
the opportunity cost of the prestige effects could be very high. They would rather give 
up the prestige benefits for their own private goods. However, they do not necessarily 
behave as they would under NR as is suggested by the model. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Donation Distributions under CR (￥20) 
 
 
3. CR vs. CNR. 
The frequency histograms of CR and CNR are shown in Figure 6.3. For category 1 
with a category amount of ￥5, both CR1 and CNR1 show a concentration of 
donations on the category amount. Since CNR offers no prestige, this concentration is 

















































































 For category 2 with a category amount of ￥8, which is not a natural focal point but 
very near to the one of ￥10, the difference of donation distributions between CR2 
and CNR2 are noteworthy. Under CR2, the most concentrated point is ￥8, which is 
the category amount. Under CNR2, however, it is ￥10, the natural focal point 
nearest to the category amount. This difference can only be explained by the effect of 
prestige. It is clearly that people tend to donate at some focal points, which could be 
the category amount or the natural ones. When prestige is offered under CR, people 
are attracted to the category where they get extra credit. CNR offers no prestige, even 
though there is a category setting, the attraction of natural focal points is much 
stronger. The natural focal point of ￥10 is higher than the category amount of ￥8, 
and it implies that the effect of warm glow is strong under CNR. In terms of the 
average donation, it suggests that ￥8 is not a proper category and it could be higher 
for the charity to take advantage of people’s taste for prestige and solicit more 
donations. 
 
As the category amount increases, fewer participants donate the category amount 
under both CR and CNR compared to the lower category amounts and fewer 
participants donate the category amount under CNR than that under CR. This is 
another support for the prestige effect. When we look at category 3 with a category 
amount of ￥12, we find few people donate ￥10 and most focus on ￥12. Those 
who want to donate ￥10 might be drawn to the category amount, since the marginal 
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cost for them is only ￥2 but they can get the extra prestige benefits if they enter the 
category. This does not happen under CNR, where no prestige benefits are offered.  
 
For category 4 with a category amount of ￥16, donations are evenly distributed 
across the category amount and the natural focal points under CR4. But for CNR4, the 
category plays little role and is almost neglected by the participants. Another 
interesting phenomenon arises that some people donate all their endowment under 
both CR4 and CNR4, which never happens under any other category settings but does 
happen under NR and ER. This might be because those who are willing to donate 
￥16 out of ￥20 values private goods very low and they do not mind donating more 
for intrinsic warm glow after entering the category. 
 
To summarize, a comparison between CR and CNR with frequency histograms 
renders us a more in-depth view on people’s donating behavior under different plans 
and category settings. We find that more people are attracted to the category amount 
under CR where prestige is offered than under CNR where there is no prestige. This is 
the evidence of the existence of the prestige effect. However, there is no evidence that 
CR is superior to CNR in terms of average donations as the mean comparison shows. 
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 6.3 Treatment Effects: Robust Test 
 
The above analysis is based on the between-subjects analysis to avoid the carry-on 
effects of different plans. The treatment structure also makes it possible for us to do 
the within-subject comparison. We check the results from the between-subjects 
comparison and within-subjects comparison to see if the carry-on effects exist in the 
treatment design. We show the comparison in Table 6.3 
 
Table 6.3 Treatment Effects: Robust Test (￥20) 
 between-subjects within-subject 



















































As in the previous analysis, we use Mann-Whitney test for between-subjects 
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comparison and Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within-subject comparison. Table 6.6 
shows that between-subjects and within-subject data produce inconsistent results. For 
the groups doing NR and CR or CNR, one pair of between-subjects data is significant 
and the other three are insignificant. The results reverse when we make within-subject 
comparison: the significant pair turns insignificant and vice versa. For the groups 
doing ER and CR or CNR, one significant pair with between-subjects comparison 
turns insignificant when we use within-subject comparison and the other pairs are 
both insignificant with two ways of comparison. The inconsistent results suggest there 
might be some carry-on effect if we run two different reporting plans sequentially. In 
the sessions, participants from group 3 to 6 are instructed to do CR or CNR prior to 
NR or ER. So the data of CR and CNR for these groups are free of the carry-on 




6.4 Treatment Effects: the Higher Endowment 
 
If we look at the treatment effects of the higher endowment of ￥50, results from the 
mean comparison and the frequency analysis are similar to those of the endowment of 
￥20, with a few high endowment features. For example, there are more natural focal 
points for the higher endowment. Among all the natural focal points, ￥20 is the most 
attractive, 40% of the endowment, less than ￥10 – 50% of the ￥20 endowment. 
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NR and ER show a similar distribution of donations. NR yields more average 
donation than CR and CR can do better or worse than ER, depending on the category. 
There is an evidence of prestige when comparing CR and CNR. At lower category 
amounts, more participants are attracted to categories under CR than under CNR. 
Many retreat from the category if it is set too high for both CR and CNR. The 
difference is, under CR they turn to a lower donation level (￥10), but under CNR 
they turn back to the concentrated amount under NR (￥20). In terms of average 
donations, the relationship between CR and CNR is ambiguous. The robust test shows 
that the carry-on effects are less severe for the higher endowment. 
 
The mean statistics, results from rank test, histograms and robust test of the higher 
endowment of ￥50 are shown in Appendix C. 
 
 
6.5 Other Effects: Income, Gender and Faculty Background 
 
Test on the income effect shows that a higher the endowment results in a lower 
contribution rate for most treatments (Table 6.4). 
 
 50
Table 6.4 Income effect: Average Donation Ratio and the Mann-Whitney Test 
Treatment Endowment =￥20 Endowment = ￥50 z-value prob 
1. NR .4586957 > .4234783 -0.759 0.4481 
2. ER .434 > .3968 -0.500 0.6171 
3. CR1 .33 > .3291667 1.714* 0.0866 
4. CR2 .374 > .3733333 0.275 0.7833 
5. CR3 .4104167 > .3696 -0.853 0.3937 
6. CR4 .4458333 > .4112 -0.473 0.6360 
7. CNR1 .2795455 < .4272727 3.062* 0.0022 
8. CNR2 .4375 > .3354545 -2.321* 0.0203 
9. CNR3 .5272727   > .2718182 -3.009* 0.0026 
10. CNR4 .3386364 < .4686364 1.810* 0.0703 
 
Test on the gender effect shows that gender difference does not play a role in donating 
decisions. The p value of the Mann-Whitney test is 0.2285.  
 
Faculty backgrounds also do not affect the amount of giving. We separate the faculty 
to three groups: arts and social sciences, science and engineering, and the others. The 
p values of Mann-Whitney test for group comparisons are 0.8228, 0.3028, and 0.3207. 
 
 
6.6 A Regression Analysis 
 
Panel data regressions yield similar results as the non-parametric statistics tests do. 
Results are shown in Table 6.5.  
 
For the first two regressions, we control the endowments and use absolute value of 
donations as the dependent variable. In the third regression, we pool all the 
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observations from both endowments and use donation ratio as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables include gender, endowment (for the pooled regression), 
treatment and faculty background. We use nine dummy variables for treatment and 
two dummy variables for faculty. The results show that treatment effects are negative 
and not significant for most cases. When the endowment is ￥20, the coefficients of 
treatment CR1 and CNR1 is negative and significant and it implies if a category is set 
too low, it will significantly decrease the average donation. When the endowment is 
￥50, the coefficient of treatment CNR3 is negative and significant and it implies if a 
category is set too high and if there is no prestige offered, average donation will also 
decrease. In the pooled donation ratio regression, the endowment coefficient is 
negative and significant. It implies that higher the endowment, lower the donation rate. 
The results are consistent with those of the non-parametric test that gender and faculty 












Coef p > |z| Coef p > |z| Coef p > |z| 
gender  .4947182 0.630 .1200723 0.955 .4582057 0.748 
endowment ----- ----- ----- ----- -10.37756 0.000 
dmtrm2  -.7832665 0.637 -1.96329 0.564 -1.251195 0.594 
dmtrm3 -2.836183 0.097 -5.211503 0.130 -3.891507 0.074 
dmtrm4 -1.883802 0.271 -3.00317 0.382 -2.269284 0.298 
dmtrm5 -1.063931 0.525 -5.503257 0.117 -3.11078 0.153 
dmtrm6 -.355598 0.832 -4.788971 0.173 -2.399669 0.271 
dmtrm7 -3.556725 0.039 .1785498 0.959 -1.645037 0.453 
dmtrm8 -.2775555 0.869 -4.783711 0.176 -2.360946 0.282 
dmtrm9 1.517899 0.369 -7.965529 0.024 -3.054128 0.164 
dmtrm10 -2.374907 0.168 2.246732 0.517 -.0200367 0.993 
dmfac2  -1.098063 0.339 -1.876356 0.425 -1.142414 0.474 
dmfac3 -.6432512 0.606 -1.592416 0.533 -.5414708 0.754 
_cons  9.48622 0.000 22.2893 0.000 20.72542 0.000 
Endowment = 20: within = 0.0992  between = 0.0597  overall = 0.0663 
Endowment = 50: within = 0.0768  between = 0.0609  overall = 0.0650 
R-sq: 
Pooled:         within = 0.5204  between =0.0226  overall = 0.2701 
 
Note: 
gender = 1 for male, 0 for female; endowment = 1 for￥20, 0 for￥50; dmtrm2 = 1 for ER, 0 for 
otherwise; dmtrm3 = 1 for CR1, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm4 = 1 for CR2, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm5 = 1 for 
CR3, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm6 = 1 for CR4, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm7= 1 for CNR1, 0 for otherwise; 
dmtrm8 = 1 for CNR2, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm9 = 1 for CNR3, 0 for otherwise; dmtrm10 = 1 for CNR4, 
0 for otherwise; dmfac2 = 1 for faculties of science or engineering, 0 for otherwise; dmfac3 = 1 for 
faculty of others, 0 for otherwise. 
 
 
6.7 Additional Information 
 
A survey form at the end of each session gives us more information on the donating 
behavior. When being asked, given an endowment of ￥100, how much do you think 
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should be the threshold level of the category, the responses are shown in Figure 6.4. 
Most are concentrated at 50, and then 80, 60, and 40. The proposed category amounts 
imply the values of prestige to the participants. People value prestige differently: 
many put it 50% of the endowment, some above and some below 50%. When we look 
at the histograms of CR, we can also see the various reactions to a change of category: 
some stick to the category amount no matter how it changes and some shrink if it is 
set too high. The different effects of category reporting on the participants suggest the 
heterogeneity of individuals. Same evidence can be found in the previous public good 












0 20 40 60 80 10010 30 50 70 90
A Proper Category given an endomwent=100  
Figure 6.4 Survey: A Proposed Category for ￥100 
 
The participants are also asked to rank the four types of treatments (NR, ER, CR and 
CNR) according to their preference. A weighted average ranking shows the preference 
is ranked as CR > CNR > NR > ER. It implies that people prefer to have their 
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donations being known to the others in a manner of category, but least like the exact 
amount reporting. Although the four kinds of reporting plans have insignificant effect 
on the average donation, people have different tastes for them. This fact supports the 




This paper aims at a better understanding of the motivations of charitable giving, and 
the role of charitable organizations using different reporting plans by a series of 
donating experiments. We try to induce the motives of prestige and warm glow by 
systematically altering the reporting plans and category settings the participants are 
facing. The general result from the experiment is that reporting plans do not have a 
significant difference in terms of the average donation they can solicit; but the 
category reporting plan does have an impact on people’s donating behavior. The 
change of behavior renders a support for the prestige effect.  
 
To sum, results are found both supportive and contrary to the predictions derived from 
the theoretical model on the reporting plans. On one hand, we find that first, under the 
category reporting plan, people tend to donate the minimum amount of the category in 
order to enter it and get credit from being reported. Second, the category reporting 
plan can do better or worse than the exact reporting plan, though not significantly, 
based on how the category is set. A high category is able to yield more donations than 
the exact reporting plan. Third, category does not mean that much to the donors under 
the category no reporting plan where no prestige is offered compared with the 
category reporting plan. A change on the distribution of donations caused by the 
category in addition to the announcement is an evidence of prestige. 
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On the other hand, the model and its predictions are challenged by the following 
results. First, there is no evidence that the exact reporting plan and the category 
reporting plans can yield higher donation than the no reporting plan. Second, if the 
category is set very low, people will not ignore it but take advantage of it by donating 
less and enter the category. If the category is set very high, some will retreat from it 
but not all of them would do as they would under no reporting. This could be 
explained by the heterogeneity of the donors. 
 
We also find that focal points play an important role in people’s donating decisions. 
They could be the natural ones or those suggested by the charity in the form of 
category. When prestige benefits are present, the attraction of category is stronger. 
Without any prestige benefits, the natural focal points are a common choice. 
 
It should be admitted that a lab environment is not exactly the reality and the donating 
experiment cannot perfectly mimic a real charitable donating campaign. To realize the 
limitations of this study can help to better understand the results and its implications. 
First, participants are students whose incentives are not the same as those frequent 
donors. Second, the endowments are windfall money. Donating with it is not the same 
as with one’s self-owned income. Third, the endowments and donations are in 
relatively small amounts. For real charitable campaign, the amount of donations 
would be much larger, as we show in the category reporting examples. Last but not 
least, reporting methods might matter. For ethics concern, we do not report the real 
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name of the participants but their seat number. Participants can see each other and the 
respective reports on them. This is not like what happens in a charitable community 
and might mitigate the effect of prestige. 
 
For future studies, more categories can be set for one category reporting scheme. The 
failure of category reporting plan to solicit a higher average donation than the no 
reporting plan is expected to be overcome when the heterogeneity of individuals is 
taken into consideration by setting more than one categories to cater for different 
tastes of prestige of the donors. We can also run a sequential game instead of a 
simultaneous game, or compare the different results from the two kinds of games. The 
private benefits of donation are supposed to be stronger under a sequential play 
(Romano and Yildirim, 2001). Another remaining task is to investigate the possibility 
and method of estimating the importance of the tastes for prestige and for warm glow 
as motivations to giving with a use of category reporting (Harbaugh 1998a). A 
comprehensive knowledge of individual’s donation behavior will enable the charities 
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Appendix A   
Materials Used in the Experiment (EN) 
 




ID No: _________________ 
 
Welcome to this study on decision making. This study will last about 60 minutes. 
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with anyone except the assistant. 
You will receive compensation for your participation, which will be based on the 
decision you make in the study. Your compensation will be paid to you in cash and in 
private at the end of the study. 
 
You have been given an envelope with 3 items - an instruction sheet, a claim card and 
an endorsement letter from the beneficiary of this study. The instruction sheet is the 
one that is currently being read aloud. 
 
Each of you has been assigned an ID number which can be found on the envelope. 
The last two number of this ID number is the same as your seat number and the seat 
table with all the seat numbers are on the blackboard. Throughout the study, we will 
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identify you with your assigned ID number and keep your real name confidential. 
 
You will have to make a series of allocation decisions under different plans and 
endowments. We will explain the plans to you as the study proceeds. Given each 
endowment, you will have to decide how much of it will be allocated as donations 
(put under “DONATE”) and be kept for your own use (put under “KEEP”). Please 
note that you are doing a real donation. The amount you allocate to “DONATE” will 
be given to a real charitable project. And the amount left for “KEEP” will be paid to 
you in cash as the compensation. You will find the compensation-binding decision by 
picking a card by yourself at the end of the experiment. 
 
After you have made all the allocation decisions, there is a survey of particulars for 
you to complete before the closure of the experiment. Then you can proceed to the 
compensation one by one. 
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A.2 Allocation Decision Sheet  
A.2.1 No Reporting 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
In these particular decisions, we will not announce your individual donations. 





Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   




A.2.2 Exact Reporting 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will announce the exact amount of 
donation that each of you have made.  
 





Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.3 Category Reporting 1  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥30—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥5 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will ANNOUNCE our donor list of “STAR DONOR” and your category will be 
known to all. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.4 Category Reporting 2  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥40—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥8 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will ANNOUNCE our donor list of “STAR DONOR” and your category will be 
known to all. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.5 Category Reporting 3  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥20—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥16 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will ANNOUNCE our donor list of “STAR DONOR” and your category will be 
known to all. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.6 Category Reporting 4  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥15—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥12 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will ANNOUNCE our donor list of “STAR DONOR” and your category will be 
known to all. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.7 Category No Reporting 1  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥15—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥12 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will NOT reveal our donor list to anyone of you but keep the record confidential. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.8 Category No Reporting 2  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥40—￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥8 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will NOT reveal our donor list to anyone of you but keep the record confidential. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.9 Category No Reporting 3  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥20 —￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥16 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will NOT reveal our donor list to anyone of you but keep the record confidential. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.2.10 Category No Reporting 4  
(Categories are randomly assigned) 
 
Allocation Decision Sheet 
 
ID No. __________________ 
 
If you donate ￥30 —￥50 with the endowment of ￥50, you will be categorized as 
a “STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
If you donate ￥5 —￥20 with the endowment of ￥20, you will be categorized as a 
“STAR DONOR” in our donor list. 
 
We will NOT reveal our donor list to anyone of you but keep the record confidential. 
 




Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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A.3 Survey Form  
 
Survey of Particulars 
 
ID No: _________________ 
Gender:  M  /  F   
Faculty:  
Year:  1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / G1 / G2 / G3 
                            1     2     3    4     5 
                                    Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
1 You are a frequent donor to the charity institutions. 
     
2 You have heard of the practice of category reporting plan adopted by some charities. 
     
3 You would prefer having your donating behavior known to the public. 
     
4 You would prefer having your donation amount known to the public. 
     
5 You believe the charity will receive the amount you donate out of your endowment.
     
6 The charity is deserving of your support.      
 
7. The are 4 different reporting plans for the charity on your donations 
 
A. No Reporting, under which they keep the donations confidential;       
B. Exact Reporting, under which they report the exact amount of donations the 
donors have made;  
C. Category Reporting, under which they reporting the donors’ donations with a 
category; 
D. Category No Reporting, under which they do not report on the category though 
there is one. 
 
Please rank the four plans according to your preference: 1____ 2____3____4____ 
 
8. Given an endowment of S$100 and a category reporting plan, what do you think a 
minimum category amount for a “STAR DONOR” should be? ____ 
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Welcome to this decision-making experiment on donating behavior. As the beneficiary 
of this experiment, we would like to express our sincere gratitude for your support and 
cooperation. As promised, all the donations collected from this experiment would be 
accepted by “Fudan Students Home”. 
 
“Fudan Students Home” was established in September, 2005. It is a voluntary 
student’s organization in the charge of the student union. Members of it are those who 
obtain the subsidy from university for their study. “Fudan Students Home” offers 
training, guidance and other services for students and encourages them to participate 
in social activities and develop their skills and abilities. The donations received will 
be used for the Home’s operation expenses, and the organization for activities for its 
members such as visiting and outing.  
 
We sincerely hope that you can make serious decisions in this experiment, and help 





Appendix B   
Materials Used in the Experiment (CN) 
 
B.1 Instruction Sheet 

























B.2 Allocation Decision Sheet  











Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
















Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.3 Category Reporting 1  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥ 5—￥ 20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 






Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.4 Category Reporting 2  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥8—￥20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 






Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.5 Category Reporting 3  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥16—￥20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 






Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.6 Category Reporting 4  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥12—￥20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 







Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.7 Category No Reporting 1  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥12—￥20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 







Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.8 Category No Reporting 2  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥ 8—￥ 20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 







Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.9 Category No Reporting 3  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥16—￥20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 







Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.2.10 Category No Reporting 4  









（ENDOWMENT = ￥50） 
如果你的捐款在￥ 5—￥ 20 之间，你将成为我们的“明星捐款人”。 







Decision Endowment Donate Keep 
1 ￥50   
2 ￥20   
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B.3 Survey Form  
调查问卷 
 
ID No: _________________ 
性别：  男  /  女   
院系： 
年级:  1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 研 1/ 研 2 / 研 3 
                            1     2     3    4     5 
                                    强烈不同意                      强烈同意  
1 你经常参加慈善捐赠      
2 你听说过 category reporting 的做法      
3 你希望你的捐赠行为公开化      
4 你希望你的捐赠金额公开化      
5 你相信该受益方会收到你的捐赠      
6 你认为该受益方值得你的支持和帮助      
 
7. 慈善机构对于捐赠者的捐款有以下四种认可方式  
A. No Reporting 对捐赠者及其捐款完全保密，不向公众公开         
B. Exact Reporting 公示捐款人及其确切捐款数额      
C. Category reporting 将捐款人按捐款金额分类，按分类公开捐款人的身份 
D. Category without Reporting 将捐款人按捐款金额分类，但不公开这个分类 
作为捐款人，请按你的偏好排列这四种方式：1)___ 2）___ 3）___4）___ 
 









Appendix C   
Testing Results for the Higher Endowment 
 
Table C.1 Treatment Effects: Mean Statistics (￥50) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
all50 234 19.0406 11.51764 0 50 
nr50 23 21.17391 13.01626 0 50 
er50 25 19.84 11.7 0 50 
cr50_1 24 16.45833 7.294901 0 30 
cr50_2 24 18.66667 8.575327 0 35 
cr50_3 25 18.48 11.82906 0 35 
cr50_4 25 20.56 15.41395 0 42 
cnr50_1 22 21.36364 7.779983 5 45 
cnr50_2 22 16.77273 10.33225 0 40 
cnr50_3 22 13.59091 13.03351 0 43 















































































   
4_CR2 
18.67 














































          
 
                                                        
10 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for between-subject comparison and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for within-subject comparison. 
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Table C.3 Treatment Effects: Robust Test (￥50) 
 between-subjects within-subject 




































































































Figure C.1 Donation Distributions under NR and ER (￥50) 
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